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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
privation of fundamental rights." 127 This holding of the Second Circuit
is in direct conflict with the views expressed by the majority in Sostre.
As the majority in a three-judge court, the Sostre dissent disregarded
the trend of argument as developed in Sostre. However, in light of Sos-
tre, the Rodriguez holding is not an insurmountable obstacle to the
definite trend toward use of section 1983 by state prisoners.
Contemplating the prison environment and the status of the pris-
oner in relation to his superiors, it is difficult to understand how the
court in Sostre can look so naively on prison practices. Prison officials
are merely men. Due to the closed environs, their task is more difficult
that that of most men. However, this should not exculpate them from
the scrutiny which the courts apply to other institutions within our
society. The man in prison has rights guaranteed by our constitutional
system. The walls of a prison do not create immunity for prison author-
ities. In this closed society it is clear that a prisoner's rights can easily be
violated without detection. Therefore, especially in light of recent oc-
currences in our prisons, the courts in exercising their constitutional
duty, should venture more often and more closely into the depths of
our penal system.
SPEEDY TRIAL. WITHIN THE CIRCUIT
The right to a speedy trial is of ancient origin.128 Today the right
has distinct constitutional12 9 and statutory' 0 bases. Although ineffectual
127 451 F.2d at 732 (citing authorities); Judge Waterman dissented on the basis of the
district court decision. Id. at 733.
128 The right to a speedy trial was recognized at least as far back as the Magna Carta
(1215) which stated: "To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice."
United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196 (D. Md.), aff'd 350 U.S. 857 (1955). The As-
size of Clarendon, written in 1166, provides evidence of the early recognition of speedy
justice:
[A]nd when a robber or murderer or thief or receiver of them has been arrested,
. . if the justices are not about to come speedily enough into the country where
they have been taken, let the sheriffs send word to the nearest justice . . . and
the justices shall send back word to the sheriffs informing them where they de-
sire the men to be brought before them; and let the sheriffs bring them before
the justices.
2 ENG. Hisr. DOCUmENTrS 408 (1953) (emphasis added), quoted in Klopfer v. United States,
386 US. 213, 223 n.9 (1966).
129 The sixth amendment provides for a fair and speedy trial in all criminal prose-
cutions. This sixth amendment right as implemented by the fourteenth amendment was
held applicable to the states in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1966).
10 FED. R. Cmi. P. 48(b) provides:
[i]f there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in
filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer the dis-
trict court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the
court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint. (emphasis added).
It has been held that Rule 48(b) by providing for dismissal because of "unnecessary
delay" goes beyond the sixth amendment by allowing a court to exercise its discretion
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for many years, through judicial mandate the right has become more
meaningful today.
The major deterrent to an implementation of the right to a speedy
trial within the Second Circuit has been the adherence to the "demand
rule" as enunciated in United States v. Lustman'3' which requires that
the defendant press for trial. This rule is rationalized by calling a speedy
trial a "personal right" which may be waived by action inconsistent with
its assertion. 13 2 Although the "demand rule" has been often criti-
in dismissing indictments for want of prosecution where the defendant's constitutional
rights have not been violated. Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d 363, 568 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Mann v. United States, 804 F.2d 394, 598 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 896
(1962); 8A, J. MooRE, FEnER. PRAcTiCE 48.03[1] (1968); cf. Pollard v. United States, 352
U.S. 354, 368 (1957) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Although the grounds for dismissal under
Rule 48(b) are broader than the constitutional right of speedy trial, a Rule 48(b) dis-
missal does not foreclose further prosecution. Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394, 398
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 896, 898 (1962); 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrcE,
48.03[l] (1968). It has also been said that Rule 48(b) provides for enforcement of the
right given by the sixth amendment to a speedy trial. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S.
354, 361 n.7 (1957).
Application of this Rule is problematic, for the "unnecessary" standard is too broad.
For a discussion of this issue, see note 143, infra.
13' 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). This "demand rule,"
discussed in note 134 infra, has been criticized by judges within the Second Circuit as
being inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee. See United States v. Dillon, 183 F.
Supp. 541, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
In a more recent case, Judge Tenney, expressed his opinion regarding the right to
a speedy trial, disagreeing with his colleagues who adhere to the "demand rule":
Once a defendant has been demonstrably prejudiced by an inexcusably long
delay occasioned by the prosecution, it would seem naive and insensible to sug-
gest that because he has not affirmatively moved for a speedy trial he has im-
pliedly waived his right thereto.
United States v. Haggett 438 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1971), quoting United States v. Stone,
319 F. Supp. 364, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
This view is particularly interesting when compared with a decision Judge Tenney
authored one year prior to Haggett but after the Dickey decision by the Supreme Court.
In that opinion he stated:
it would be an abdication of its judicial responsibility to attempt reversal of
appellate authority on an identical issue, by giving retroactive application to
recent dicta set forth by the Supreme Court.
Maxwell v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
For a compilation of other federal jurisdictions which have adhered to the "de-
mand rule," see Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L REV. 1587, 1602
n.76 (1965) [hereinafter Lagging Right].
132Lagging Right, supra note 131, at 1602. In addition, the rule is justified on the
theory that silence is inconsistent with the assertion of the right which presupposes that
delay always benefits the accused. The doctrine is essentially a formulation of policy,
since it guards against freeing possibly guilty defendants without trial. Id.
It seems difficult to accept the proposition that a defendant's failure to demand a
trial may constitute a waiver of such constitutional rights. A justice of the Supreme
Court has noted that:
the equation of silence or inaction with waiver is a fiction that has been cate-
gorically rejected by this Court when other fundamental rights are at stake.
Dickey v. Florida, 898, U.S. 30, 49 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).
Thus the extensive use of the waiver fiction in the speedy trial area is incongruous
with its application to other constitutional rights, since courts have traditionally defined
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cized, 33 it remains, for the time being, 34 the established policy regard-
ing speedy trial delay in the Second Circuit. 35
Within the concept of speedy trial there exist the problems of
"waiver" as an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court has espoused
the policy of "indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against waiver." Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
133 The basis of this criticism is that the "demand rule" offers no viable choice to
a criminal defendant. Lagging Right at 1610. For cases criticizing the rule, see note 132
supra.
Exceptions to the requirement of demand by defendant for a speedy trial include:
(1) where defendant had no knowledge of the pending charges, and (2) where defendant
was powerless to assert his right because of imprisonment, ignorance, and lack of legal
advice. See Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968).
It has been noted that the requirement of a demand "stresses that the right to a
speedy trial is not designed as a sword for defendant's escape, but rather as a shield for
his protection." Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLU,. L. REv. 846,
853 (1957). However, in criticism of the rule, one court stated that
it is difficult to accept that interests so fundamental and so pervasive as those
served by the right to a speedy trial are enforceable by judicial sanctions only
at the behest of defendants who take the relatively unlikely step of demanding
an early trial.
United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268, 274 (1968). (citation omitted). For further
criticism of the "demand rule," see note 139 infra.
134 The Second Circuit has consistently followed the "demand rule" requiring the
defendant to actively seek a speedy disposition of his case, or be deemed to have waived
such a right. See, United States v. Haggett, 438 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
946 (1971); United States v. Parrott, 425 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Aber-
son, 419 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Roberts, 408 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1969);
United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1043 (1968);
United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). While
the Supreme Court, in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), seemingly rejected this rule,
subsequent cases in the Second Circuit suggest that no judicial abdication of the rule
has occurred.
135 As of this writing the decisional law in the Second Circuit remains unchanged.
The latest Second Circuit case, United States v. Haggett, 438 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1971)
affirms the adherence to the "demand rule" despite the Dickey decision. However, it
appears that the Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases issued by the
Circuit Council of the Second Circuit, will reverse the trend of decisional law relating
to speedy trial inquiries and specifically to the requirement of demand. Appendix, 28
U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1971). See generally Comment, Speedy Trials and the Second Circuit
Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1058 (1971).
For a detailed study of these Rules, effective July 5, 1971. see Note, A Look at the New
Second Circuit Rules for the Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 56 MINN. L. REV. 73
(1971). See also note 144 infra.1 36 1n analyzing the concept of "delay," consideration must be given to at least three
basic factors: the source of the delay, the reasons for it, and whether the delay prejudiced
interests protected by the speedy trial clause. Dickey v. Florida, 398 US. 30, 48 n.12
(1970).
The delay the defendant alleges dearly must go beyond the ordinary lapse of time
between indictment and trial to be constitutionally violative. As the Court noted:
in large measure because of the many procedural safeguards provided an ac-
cused, the ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution, are designed to move at
a deliberate pace. A requirement of unreasonable speed would have a deleterious
effect upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect
itself
United States v. Ewell, 383 US. 116, 120 (1965).
1972]
ST. JOHI'S LAW REVIEW
delay 86 and prejudice.137 In past cases, commencing with Beavers v.
Haubert'38 and culminating in Dickey v. Florida,189 the Supreme Court
has studied these problems. Its 1970 decision in Dickey seemingly pro-
vides a contradiction to the "demand rule" of the Second Circuit. How-
ever, the Second Circuit has upheld the "demand rule" in the face of
this dictum of the Supreme Court.140
It was not until United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann,141 that the
It is well recognized that although a defendant has a right to a speedy trial, all
that is required is that the pace of government proceedings be reasonable under all
circumstances. United States v. Kaufman 311 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Pollard v.
United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957). Recent cases outside the Second Circuit, however,
have adopted an approach that places responsibility for prosecution on the law en-
forcement agencies, so that where unusual delay is not attributable to special circum-
stances it is constitutionally violative. Importantly, the Court in Dickey also applied
stricter standards to prosecution-caused delay. Additionally, a few cases have held that
delay solely caused by court congestion can be constitutionally violative of the speedy
trial guarantee.
137 In regard to trial delay, the need for defendant to establish that he has been
prejudiced by such delay, as a condition precedent to dismissal of his charges is unsettled.
One court has held that prejudice is irrelevant when there is undue delay, United States
v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958). Other courts have viewed prejudice as one of
the definitional elements of unconstitutional delay, but differ on the question of who
should have the burden of proving its existence. For a discussion of "prejudice" within
trial delay see Lagging Right at 1591. Apparently, there are three schools of thought
regarding the requirement of prejudice. These schools hold: (1) that it is incumbent
upon the accused to make a showing of prejudice; (2) prejudice is presumed and neces-
sarily follows from long delay; (3) when delay is substantial, the prosecution must prove
that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that resulting from ordinary and
inevitable delay. See cases cited in Lagging Right at 1592 nn.26-28.
138 198 U.S. 77 (1905). This was the first case balancing an individual's right to a
speedy trial with the rights of the public justice. In Beavers, the Supreme Court held
that the right of a speedy trial is "necessarily relative."
In effect, the Court's decision placed individual rights subordinate to the welfare
of the State.
139 398 U.S. 30 (1970). After tracing the development of the right of speedy trial,
the Court focussed its attention on the "demand rule" of the Second Circuit. The
Court questioned the view that an accused loses his right to a speedy trial by silence or
inaction on three grounds. First, the view lacks a realistic understanding of the effect
of delay. While the Court admitted that some defendants may welcome delay, it coun-
tered that
an accused may just as easily object to delay for its prolongation of the time in
which he must live in uncertainty, carrying the emotional and financial bur-
dens of accusation, and possessing the conditioned freedom of a potential felon.
Id. at 49 (Brennan, J., concurring). Second, it is based on a concept of waiver in direct
contravention to precedent. Third:
it is possible that the implication of waiver from silence or inaction misallocates
the burden of ensuring a speedy trial. The accused has no duty to bring on his
trial. He is presumed innocent until proved guilty; arguably, he should be pre-
sumed to wish to exercise his right to be tried quickly, unless he affirmatively
accepts delay.
Id. at 49-50 (Brennan, J., concurring).
140 United States v. Haggett, 438 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Maxwell v. United
States, 319 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
141 437 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1970). In this case the defendant was incarcerated in one
jurisdiction while charges were pending against him in another jurisdiction. Although
[Vol. 46:468
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Second Circuit seized the opportunity to espouse an urgent need for
uniform guidelines for the disposition of criminal cases. This "need"
crystalized into a reality by the Circuit Council of the Second Circuit's
promulgation of nine rules relating to speedy trials.14 These rules sup-
plement decisional law quantitatively in determining what constitutes
unnecessary delay.143 Furthermore, these rules resolve the controversy
defendant's habeas corpus petition was denied, the court's appraisal of the right of
speedy trial referred to Dickey wherein it is stated that:
[t]he right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted
in hard reality on the need to have charges promptly exposed. If the case for
the prosecution calls on the accused to meet charges rather than rest on the in-
firmities of the prosecution's case, as is the defendants right, the time to meet
them is when the case is fresh. Stale claims have never been favored by the law,
and far less so in criminal cases.
Dickey v. Florida, 598 U.S. 80, 87 (1970).
By "condoning" trial delay, courts have unknowingly divested themselves of impor-
tant powers. In regard to this it has been noted that:
[olne of the most undesirable results of the delay in the trial of an offense is
that the power to determine consequences of conviction is transferred from the
judicial to the prosecuting or police authorities. The court is thus deprived, at
the relevant time and under relevant circumstances, of the opportunity to de-
termine whether sentence, in case of conviction on the deferred charge, should
be suspended or imposed concurrently, or consecutively with sentence which the
convict is serving in another jurisdiction.
Schindler, Inter Jurisdictional Conflict and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 GIN. L. Rxv.
179, 182 (1966).
142 See Appendix, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1971). These rules encompass: priorities in
scheduling criminal cases, cases involving incarcerated defendants, maximum periods in
which time the government must be ready for trial, exclusions from the computation
of the period of delay, "demand rule" and waiver, and other related subjects. The need
for such rules is exemplified by the statements accompanying the Rules wherein it is
stated:
[t]he public interest requires disposition of criminal charges with all reasonable
dispatch. The deterrence of crime by prompt prosecution of charges is frustrated
whenever there is a delay in the disposition of a case which is not required for
some good reason. The general observance of law rests largely upon a respect for
the process of law enforcement. When the process is slowed down by repeated
delays in the disposition of charges for which there is no good reason, public
confidence is seriously eroded.
Id. at 7.
143 Rule 4 provides that:
in all cases the government must be ready for trial within six months from the
date of the arrest, service of summons, detention, or the filing of a complaint or
of a formal charge upon which the defendant is to be tried (other than a sealed
indictment), whichever is earliest. If the government is not ready for trial within
such time . . . and if the defendant is charged only with non-capital offenses,
then, upon application of the defendant or upon motion of the district court,
after opportunity for argument, the charge shall be dismissed.
Id. at 2.
This provides a definite time period, i.e., six months, within which the government
must proceed to trial unless there is a showing of special circumstances by the prose-
cuting attorney. Id. at 2-4. This is indeed a great innovation when viewed in light of
the vague standard of unnecessary delay in Rule 48(b) of the FE. R. CIeI. P.
It has been noted that Rule 48(b) is:
susceptible of being manipulated to justify delay and defeat the spirit of the
right to a speedy trial. The major difficulty with the standard of unnecessary
delay is that no one can tell if a particular defendant is being denied a speedy
trial without a judicial pronouncement. For this reason it is suggested that the
1972]
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regarding the "demand rule" in favor of the defendant, while at the
same time requiring him to actively move for discharge. 144
These rules provide a viable means whereby a defendant in a
criminal prosecution may implement his constitutional right to a speedy
trial. While Justice Brennan has suggested that many of the basic ques-
tions about the scope and context of the speedy trial guarantee remain
to be resolved,145 it is hopeful that implementation of and adherence to
the new rules will accomplish this purpose within the jurisdiction of the
Second Circuit.
malleable standard of a speedy trial should be replaced by a more explicit fed-
eral standard requiring the accused to be brought to trial within a definite time
limit.
Lagging Right at 1618.
It now appears that the Second Circuit is leading the way for federal legislation
which explicitly determines what constitutes a "delay" that is constitutionally violative
of the defendant's right to speedy trial.
144 Rule 8 provides that:
[a] demand by a defendant is not necessary for the purpose of invoking the
rights conferred by these rules. However, failure of a defendant to move for dis-
charge prior to plea of guilty or trial shall constitute waiver of such rights .
Appendix, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1971).
This rule effectively reverses the policy of the Second Circuit regarding the require-
ment of a demand by defendant.
145 Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 56 (Brennan, J. concurring).
